I thank the authors for their suggestions and am interested in pursuing them. As a student of Jerome Kagan's at Harvard University, I am familiar with the contribution that temperament makes to our understanding of human nature, and I firmly believe that previous research on temperamental traits should be explored in an ongoing model of the shared vulnerability of creativity and psychopathology. My question is this: Do these temperamental traits and types address the same level of analysis as the other components of the current shared-vulnerability model, such as reduced latent inhibition, neural hyperconnectivity, or enhanced working memory capacity? The purpose of the model is to break down the components of shared vulnerability to the finest grain level of analysis possible, identifying cognitive mechanisms that can be studied (if not now, then eventually) at the level of location-specific neurotransmitter functions and also at the level of genetic contribution. Constructs such as ectomorphism and sensory-processing sensitivity may address shared vulnerabilities at a somewhat higher level of analysis. These temperamental constructs may themselves share finer grained factors with both creativity and psychopathology that could be defined at some more basic level of neuroscience.
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For example, one of the cognitive mechanisms that govern sensory sensitivity in both creative and high sensory-processing sensitivity people may be individual differences in the thalamic gating threshold. This mechanism has been related to sensorimotor processing and dopaminergic input, as well as to a liability for both schizophrenia and creative output. 4 Given the above considerations, the appropriate sensory-processing component to be added to the shared-vulnerability model would be thalamic gating irregularities rather than the sensory-processing sensitivity trait described by Aron and Aron. 1 This seems a worthy addition to the shared-vulnerability model, and I thank Rizzo-Sierra and colleagues for bringing attention to it. I invite them to contact me directly for continued discussion of how previous research on temperament and body type could illuminate the shared-vulnerability model.
Shelley H Carson, PhD Cambridge, Massachusetts

Reframing the Placebo Concept
Dear Editor:
The April issue of The CJP included 3 papers on the use of placebos in psychiatric research. [1] [2] [3] Reading these excellent papers reminded us of past studies of our research group on addictions. One of our conclusions was that belonging to the placebo group in a trial for the treatment of alcohol dependence was persistently beneficial. In subsequent projects, we matched these subjects with others treated in several specialized institutions by the usual psychosocial approaches. Outcome measures, repeated every 6 months, showed that these more intensive treatments were slightly superior to our placebo groups, significantly in some areas, not in others. 4 More far-reaching conclusions were offered by a multisite study conducted by the US National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse. The Combined Pharmacotherapies and Behavioural Interventions Study compared 2 medications (naltrexone and acamprosate), behavioural intervention, and a placebo group. 5 Improvement in all 9 cells remained important up to the end of the follow-up period: the placebo was inferior to naltrexone but superior to the behaviouralpsychosocial approach. The latter, elaborated by a group of the best American specialists, combined the most evidencebased approaches in up to 20 hours of intervention over 4 months.
Any treatment implies imaginary (for example, self-image) and symbolic (for example, relational) components, and they are exclusively present in the placebo groups. A physicist can spend years quantifying the vibrations from the instruments of a symphonic orchestra, without pretending to explain the esthetic emotion produced. Similarly, clinical research is a branch of science, but in spite of all efforts it remains a unique combination of art and science, allowing some imaginary and symbolic components to enter the scene as uninvited guests, and our placebo groups belong to this category. Understandably, many clinical researchers and pharmaceutical companies tend to neglect this paradigm shift specific to human research.
When the magnitude of the placebo effects reaches such dimensions as the ones discussed above, they deserve deeper reflection about their meaning and their implications for ethical, evidence-based treatment. The CJP and the authors of these articles deserve our thanks for this introduction. 
Understanding Placebo Science: A Word About Deception
In their commentary, Dr Dongier and Dr Brown discuss additional findings that speak to the magnitude of placebo effects; meanwhile, survey data and media reports begin to unveil the use of placebos in clinical settings. In light of such trends, a thorough understanding of the relative merits and drawbacks of placebos, guided by judicious research, is fundamental to crafting policies for the use of placebos in medical care.
Our findings 1 show that 17.5% and 10.3% of psychiatrists and other physicians, respectively, report that if they were to prescribe a placebo to a patient, they would tell the patient that it is a placebo. In his piece, Kirsch 2 raises an interesting question: Were any of these the doctors who acknowledged that they had, in fact, prescribed placebos? If so, it suggests that at least some physicians doubt the widespread assumption that one has to deceive their patients for a placebo to be effective. Kirsch's question is particularly topical considering a recent study 3 replicating and extending a towering study from over 4 decades ago. 4 In that historical report, placebos were effective even when patients knew that they received them. In other words, physicians can use placebos nondeceptively by providing patients with the paradoxical statement that they need treatment but that they could improve with a capsule containing no drug.
We re-analyzed our data 1 and found that 31% of psychiatrists and 17% of other practitioners who would tell their patients they are receiving a placebo also report having prescribed a placebo. Thus at least some physicians seem to administer placebos while telling their patient the truth. Kirsch was on the money; however, whether placebos can be effective without deception seems to depend on patient expectations. Further research should attempt to explore nondeceptive placebo treatments in different patient populations.
Scientific reports make it clear that receiving-rather than the actual content of-medical treatment can elicit and drive a healing process. Many myths surround placebos-claiming them to be unspecific, short-lived, and deceptive-despite contrary evidence in the scientific literature. One of the take-home messages from our study, therefore, is that teaching physicians and medical students about placebos is central to scholarship in medical education and, ultimately, to the quality of health care. We need to do a better job of understanding placebo science to appropriately address the use of placebos in clinical practice. Realizing that placebos need not always be synonymous with deception, for example, is a step in the right direction.
